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Abstract
This paper surveys and interprets the attitudes of scientists to the use of flux adjustments in climate projections with
coupled Atmosphere Ocean General Circulation Models. The survey is based largely on the responses of 19 climate
modelers to several questions and a discussion document circulated in 1995. We interpret the responses in terms of the
following factors: the implicit assumptions which scientists hold about how the environmental policy process deals
with scientific uncertainty over human-related global warming; the different scientific styles that exist in climate
research; and the influence of organizations, institutions, and policy upon research agendas. We find evidence that
scientists’ perceptions of the policy process do play a role in shaping their scientific practices. In particular, many of
our respondents expressed a preference for keeping discussion of the issue of flux adjustments within the climate
modeling community, apparently fearing that climate contrarians would exploit the issue in the public domain. While
this may be true, we point to the risk that such an approach may backfire. We also identify assumptions and cultural
commitments lying at a deeper level which play at least as important a role as perceptions of the policy process in
shaping scientific practices. This leads us to identify two groups of scientists, “pragmatists” and “purists,” who have
different implicit standards for model adequacy, and correspondingly are or are not willing to use flux adjustments.
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21. INTRODUCTION
Controversy within science has often fascinated observers and practitioners of that science alike.
How and why do differences of opinion and practice emerge between scientists working in the same
specialty? Fascination (and engagement) with such controversy often grows in proportion to the
public policy importance of such scientific knowledge. This is especially so in political cultures such
as that of the USA where power is distributed, the relations between political factions are frequently
antagonistic, and formal accountability for policy often rests upon technical knowledge. This has
been shown by a large body of research on the role of science in regulatory policy making and risk
assessment.1, According to many scientists, such controversy often distorts the real issues, as for
example in the interpretations of climate change science promoted by “contrarian” or “skeptical”
scientists and industry advocacy groups such as the Global Climate Coalition. Politicians and
academics have argued that these views have received undue attention given the questionable
credibility of many of their scientific arguments.2 Climate change science is certainly not an equal
contest between “two sides” as media accounts often imply (Edwards and Schneider, 1997).2
Such conflict may hinder scientific progress and intelligent policy because it is structured in
binary terms—anthropogenic climate change, yes or no? Yet agreement among most climate
change scientists that the contrarian interpretation is dubious does not imply that climate scientists
entertain no differences of opinion among themselves. Such differences are often subtle, but in our
view they concern key issues and may yield insights for both science and policy which the public
conflict and its binary form obscure.
While the contrarians appear to distrust any knowledge supporting anthropogenic climate
change, the mainstream climate science community trusts the basic tools, techniques and
understanding of the profession: climate models, established data-sets, characterisation of key
processes and feedbacks, etc. Disagreements within the mainstream community involve the relative
strengths of such tools, the applicability of certain insights to particular arguments, and the degree
of trust which can be invested in the different elements which together constitute the basis for the
community’s understanding.3 Often, disagreements within this community are about the conditions
under which different commitments might be appropriate.
Such differences within the scientific community are an important topic for climate scientists
because they are more relevant to the everyday practices and preoccupations of the climate scientists
than are the contrarians’ arguments. They provide insight into the ways that climate scientists go
about their work, think about scientific issues, build-up confidence in one approach rather than
another, negotiate their standards of validation, consistency, accuracy, etc., and define their identity
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 Jasanoff, S.: 1990, The Fifth Branch: Science Advisers as Policymakers, Harvard University Press, Harvard;
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in Science-for-Policy: The Case of the IPCC Second Assessment Report,” submitted manuscript.
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 Hassol, S.J., and Katzenberger, J. (eds.): 1997, Elements of Change 1996: Session Two: Characterizing and
Communicating Scientific Uncertainty, Aspen Global Change Institute, Aspen, Colorado.
3in relation to other communities in and outside science. We will argue that a better understanding of
such intra-community differences is of value to climate scientists themselves, because it can assist
self-reflection and improve their presentation of the science to outside communities. In addition, a
more nuanced understanding of the climate science community on the part of research funders,
policy makers, NGOs, the media, and commentators on climate science, may help to build up trust
between knowledge-producers and knowledge -users. Such trust may allow scientific uncertainty
in the field of global climate change to be dealt with in a more constructive way than the typical
view that uncertainty is a sign of weakness in scientific thinking and practice.
The Flux Adjustment Case-Study
In this paper we discuss a controversy that arose in climate change science in the late 1980s,
over the use of “flux adjustments” or “flux corrections” in coupled Atmosphere-Ocean General
Circulation Models (A/O GCMs). During interviews with climate modelers conducted in the early
to mid-1990s, author Shackley came across strong opinions both in favour of, and opposed to,
using flux adjustments. The controversy was not at that time discussed in the media, but was only
evident when one talked informally to modelers at a number of centers. Authors Risbey and Stone,
as climatologists themselves (but not then using coupled A/O GCMs) were concerned about the
scientific assumptions behind the use of flux adjustments, and their implications for the reliability
of model output. We also observed that discussions over flux adjustments came to have a more
public and political content in the run-up to the Second Assessment Report (SAR) of the
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), which was finalized at the end of 1995 and
the beginning of 1996. For instance, a well known science correspondent wrote a piece about flux
adjustment in Science entitled “Climate Modeling’s Fudge Factor Comes Under Fire.”4 In the
wake of the First Conference of the Parties to the Framework Convention on Climate Change
(FCCC), held in Berlin in April 1995, several newspaper articles appeared in Germany making
skeptical comments on the science of climate change, one of them citing the use of flux
adjustments as supporting evidence.5
Author Shackley attended the Plenary Session of IPCC’s science working group which met in
Madrid in late 1995 to finalize the text of the SAR’s Executive Summary. The IPCC process
involves leading scientists from different countries contributing as lead authors to specific chapters
of the IPCC’s reports. A number of these advisory scientists were at the Madrid meeting. Industry
representatives had been invited to submit comments on the draft text and they wanted the text
changed so that the (in their view) still provisional character of GCMs was duly emphasised.
A major justification for this was that coupled models required large flux adjustments to prevent
climate “drift” in simulations of the current climate. For example, the Global Climate Coalition,
an industry NGO, suggested inserting the following sentence in the Policy Makers’ Summary:
Confidence in a coupled model’s simulation of transient climate change is reduced if the
climate drift is large and/or the feedbacks are seriously distorted by flux adjustment.6
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 Kerr, R.: 1994, “Climate Modeling’s Fudge Factor Comes Under Fire,” Science, 265, 1528.
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 Flohl, R.: 1995, “Unsichtbare Hand lenkt Klimaforschung,” FAZ, 12.4.95.
6
 Submission of the Global Climate Coalition to 5th IPCC WGI Plenary, November 1995.
4At Madrid, the Global Climate Coalition’s representative suggested inserting a box on flux
adjustments in the Technical Summary. The advisory scientists present argued against this. In their
judgment there was danger of over-emphasizing the importance of flux adjustments, even if there
were indeed questions about their effects which could not currently be answered. Their view
prevailed over that of the industry representatives. Similar arguments—that flux adjustments
effectively invalidate coupled A/O GCMs—have been heard from industry scientists in other
contexts.7
Author Shackley surmised from this (and other IPCC meetings he attended) that the advisory
scientists’ position was influenced by an awareness of the politically motivated attack on GCMs
by some industry scientists (for the purpose of discrediting the scientific basis for, and hence
delaying, the climate negotiations). The scientists were reluctant to give opportunities to critics by
over-emphasizing (as they saw it) the issue of flux adjustments. It was indeed a sensitive issue.
Drafts of the IPCC’s supplementary report of 1992 also reveal that advisory scientists tailored the
presentation of flux adjustments so that the issue would not assume what they regarded as undue
prominence.8
This experience illustrates that advisory scientists and industry experts are not simply
representing the scientific knowledge-base as accurately as possible in preparing expert summaries.
They are also thinking about how different audiences will respond to the information presented,
and they have an implicit idea of how the policy-making process works. It seems to us that
industry experts are assuming that they can limit the policy implications of the IPCC’s executive
summary by including many caveats in the key sentences. The advisory scientists seem to be
reacting against such attempts by limiting the use of such caveats. Therefore the mainstream
advisory scientists and the industry experts / contrarians agree to some extent on the political
consequences of such caveats. The latter however seemed intent on undermining the scientific
case for climate change, presumably to hinder policy actions which are perceived to have negative
consequences for the industrial sectors they represented. The former, on the other hand, were
intent on defending the legitimacy of the scientific judgement which lay behind the IPCC’s report
and its Technical Summary from what they perceived as politically inspired attacks.
But how do such debates relate to the community of climate modelers, whose work and
viewpoints the IPCC is supposed to represent? Do climate researchers indeed perceive flux
adjustments as an issue which does not deserve prominence in summaries aimed at policy makers
and non-specialists? Do flux adjustments significantly influence the status of climate models?
Were these debates another instance of the industry and contrarian fringe trying to politicise a
technical issue, best discussed within the climate modeling community? Below we set out to
explore these questions.
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 For example, at a meeting Shackley attended in 1993 between modelers at the Hadley Centre and industry scientists
and officials from the International Petroleum Industry Environmental Conservation Association (IPIECA). An
IPIECA workshop in 1994 also concluded that: “Because of the physical non-reality of these adjustments, they
raise questions about the physical basis of the models themselves. The adjustments could be an indication that
some important physical processes in the climate system are missing or incorrectly represented in the models”
(page 5, IPIECA, Experts Workshop on Critical Issues in the Science of Global Climate Change, London).
This portrayal interprets flux adjustments, its effects and consequences, rather sceptically.
8
 See footnote 53.
5Methodology
To assess the range of specialist opinion on flux adjustments we conducted a survey of climate
modelers and other climate scientists. We posted a briefing note to climate scientists together with a
covering letter outlining some of our interests in the issue, and requested responses to eight
questions (see Box 1). The full list of respondents is shown in Table 1, from which it can be seen
that responses were received from most of the major modeling Centers, and a number of the main
scientific commentators on the models. The responses, comments and opinions of each respondent
have, however, been kept strictly anonymous. (We have used quotes from our respondents in the
text, and for consistency have encoded that of each respondent with a capital letter).
The evidence we obtained suggests that there are significant differences in opinion amongst
modelers, indeed what could be termed different cultures of doing climate modeling, or “epistemic
cultures.”9 The flux adjustment issue acted as a prism through which we could detect subtle, more
Box 1. Questions to Climate Modelers and Climate Scientists on Flux Adjustment (1995 Survey)
1. Our first question concerns the objectivity of the application of flux adjustment in control and
perturbation runs. By “objectivity” we mean the extent to which the adjustments are the same
in the control and perturbation runs or whether, some further ad hoc change is made to the
flux adjustment values when applied to either or both of the control and perturbation runs.
2. Have you stated the theoretical rationale for flux adjustment in any publications or
documentation? (If so, we would be grateful for references or copies.)
3. As far as you know, how does the application of flux adjustment differ between the key
modeling centers?
4. Have you conducted any sensitivity-type tests on the effects of errors in the component
models, and their compensation by flux adjustment, on the model’s behavior (such as the
stability of equilibria in the model, and the transient response)?
5. Have you conducted any tests of the robustness of the assumption of linearity implicit in using
flux adjustment? If it is not currently possible to devise tests to explore the robustness, why is
this so?
6. Is there any way of separating the sources of the errors which produce model drift? (e.g. , those
which emerge randomly from the equations from those which arise because of errors in the
numerical solution). If so, have you conducted any tests on the implications for flux adjustment
of the sources of errors?
7. What, in your opinion, is the source of errors in your models, and/or other models, which
leads to the need for flux adjustments?
8. It is  sometimes claimed that increasing the resolution of the model will reduce the amount of
flux adjustment presently applied. Do you share this opinion? What other approaches are there
to reducing flux adjustment and how would you prioritize these?
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 There is a large literature on styles in science. The sources we have used most are: Rudwick, M.: 1982, “Cognitive
Styles in Geology,” in Douglas, M. (ed.), Essays in the Sociology of Perception, RKP, London.; Maienschein,
J.: “Epistemic Styles in German and American Embryology,” Science in Context, 4(2), 407-427; Hacking, I.:
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6Table 1. Individuals Who Have Taken Part In, Or Contributed To, The Survey
Name Institution Country
George Boer Canadian Centre for Climate Modeling and Analysis, U. of Victoria Canada
Lawrence Gates PCMDI, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory USA
Hal Gordon CSIRO, Division of Atmospheric Research Australia
Klaus Hasselmann Max-Planck Institut fur Meteorologie, Hamburg Germany
Martin Hoffert Earth Systems Group, New York University USA
Syukuro Manabe Geophysical Fluid Dynamics Laboratory, Princeton University USA
Bryant McAveney Bureau of Meteorology Research Centre, Melbourne Australia
Gerald Meehl National Center for Atmospheric Research, Boulder USA
John Mitchell Hadley Centre, UK Meteorological Office UK
Akira Noda Climate Research Department, Meterologic Research Institute Japan
Barrie Pittock Climate Impact Group, CSIRO Division of Atmospheric Research Australia
Stefan Rahmstorf Institut fur Meereskunde, Kiel Germany
Edwin Schneider Center for Ocean-Land-Atmosphere Studies, Calverton USA
Ronald Stouffer Geophysical Fluid Dynamics Laboratory, Princeton University USA
Hevre le Treut Laboratoire Meteorologie Dynamique, Paris France
Warren Washington National Center for Atmospheric Research, Boulder USA
Thomas Wigley University Corporation of Atmospheric Research, Boulder USA
John Woods Graduate School of Environment, Imperial College, London UK
Carl Wunsch Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge USA
Other Individuals who contributed specific comments
Chris Gordon Hadley Center, UK Meteorological Office UK
William Ingram Hadley Center, UK Meteorological Office UK
Michael MacCracken Office of U.S. Global Change Research Program USA
Tim Palmer European Centre for Medium-Range Weather Forecasting, Reading UK
Roger Pielke University of Colorado, Boulder USA
David Roberts Hadley Centre, UK Meteorological Office UK
Anthony Slingo Hadley Centre, UK Meteorological Office UK
generic, differences in GCM modeling approaches. These different cultures result in different sets
of standards by which climate change science is evaluated. What is a good piece of research
according to those following one style, is not viewed so favourably by those working in a different
style. The existence of different styles raises issues concerning the assessment of GCM modeling
for policy purposes, a point we will return to at the end of the paper.
So far, this is familiar territory to those who have a professional or personal interest in
understanding how science works. Something else took us by surprise, however, and this is the
extent to which our enquiry provoked some strong reactions: while there was support for our
project, the criticism was vociferous. What had we done to provoke such a reaction? The
experiences at the IPCC, described above, provide some clues. Our intervention was, it appeared,
being assessed by some respondents in a similar way to how they assessed the intervention of
industry experts at the IPCC Plenary Sessions. That is, the potential policy ramifications of an
enquiry such as ours, played an important role in shaping how some of our contacts responded.
Somewhat unexpectedly, therefore, our research has shed light not only on a technical issue, but
also on differences in how scientists react to an enquiry which is concerned with the interface of
science and policy.
Before proceeding with our analysis of the modelers’ responses, we provide a short overview
of some technical dimensions of the flux adjustment issue.
72. USE OF FLUX ADJUSTMENTS IN CLIMATE MODELS
2.1 The Importance of Coupled Climate Models in the Climate Problem
Coupled A/O GCMs are the most sophisticated climate models, representing the state-of-the-
art. These models provide potentially the best means for determining how rapidly the increased
heating of ocean surface layers due to increases in greenhouse gases will be mixed into the deeper
ocean layers. If it is mixed slowly, global surface warming will be fast, but if it is mixed rapidly,
global surface warming will be slow. The mixing into the deeper layers is accomplished primarily
by oceanic convection and the ocean’s thermohaline circulation (THC), and these processes are
best simulated by coupled A/O GCMs. To date, coupled A/O GCMs have not been able to produce
a realistic equilibrium THC without using flux adjustments.10 Indeed, when flux adjustments are
removed in the GFDL GCM, the THC collapses. Thus the rapidity of global warming predicted by
these models is ultimately influenced by their flux adjustments.11  The same is true of simpler
models, where the rapidity is controlled by an arbitrarily specified heat capacity and/or rate of
mixing of heat into the deep oceans.
Coupled A/O GCMs in principle provide the best means for simulating climate change at
regional scales. This is because they explicitly include latitude, longitude, and height dimensions
(which are not all explicit in simpler models), and because they contain ocean dynamics (as well as
atmospheric dynamics), which determine ocean circulations and influence regional climates. The
surface fluxes of heat and moisture are an important component of the energy balance for a region.
The veracity of regional simulations with coupled A/O GCMs is vitiated by the fact that the models
require flux adjustments of heat and moisture which are often comparable to the actual fluxes
produced by the model at many grid points.
2.2 Drift in Coupled Climate Models
When atmospheric GCMs and oceanic GCMs are coupled together, the climate of the coupled
model tends to drift into a quite different climate state from the one that the models produce when
spun up separately. The drift would be manifest for instance as a reasonably steady increase or
decrease of sea surface temperature or salinity in the coupled system away from temperatures or
salinities characteristic of the present climate. The drift is problematic because some of the
feedbacks in the climate system depend on temperature or salinity, and it is important to represent
the feedbacks correctly when simulating changes in the climate system. The size of the climate drift
occurring in the models varies from model to model, but can be larger than the model’s simulated
transient greenhouse climate change response.12
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 IPCC, Climate Change 1995: The Science of Climate Change, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1996.
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 Even when flux corrections are used to provide a realistic THC, i.e., to get a realistic mass circulation in the
North Atlantic Ocean, as in the GFDL GCM, this does not guarantee an accurate mixing of heat. For example,
in the same GFDL GCM, with a realistic mass circulation, the North Atlantic poleward heat transport is about
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determine observational transport to be 1.2 –  0.3 PW at 25o N in the North Atlantic Ocean. There is as yet no
data that can be used to estimate whether the THC’s vertical heat transport is being simulated accurately.
12
 Schneider, E.: 1996, “Flux Correction and the Simulation of Changing Climate,” Annales Geophysicae, 14, 336-341.
82.3 Methods to Compensate for Climate Drift
The drift in coupled A/O GCMs is an indication that there are underlying errors in the models.
Some modeling groups have attempted to compensate for the drift by adjusting the surface fluxes
of heat and moisture (and sometimes also momentum) in the models, while other groups have
chosen not to adjust the fluxes. Of the 17 coupled A/O GCMs listed in Meehl (1995) and IPCC
(1996), seven employ flux adjustments.13 Some of the models that do not use flux adjustments use
other artificial constraining techniques to compensate for drift, such as truncating the northern
boundary of the oceans, or restoring the deep midlatitude oceans’ state to observations. Two recent
A/O GCMs are sufficiently improved that their climate drifts, at least with respect to temperature,
are greatly reduced. These are NCAR’s Climate System Model (CSM) and the Hadley Centre’s
HadCM3 model.14 Both of these models’ surface temperatures are stable for multi-century runs,
without the use of flux adjustments. (The CSM does however use a global correction to the
freshwater budget to account for the absence of river runoff in the model.) Nevertheless both of
these models do still have strong trends in ocean salinity.14 The CSM simulation was stopped after
300 years because “sooner or later, the ocean circulation would have changed substantially away
from the present climate.”14
While flux adjustment has engendered much attention, it is important to remember that the real
scientific problem is the model errors that underlie the drift, not whether a model group chooses to
adjust the model fluxes to compensate for the drift or not. Flux adjustment is a palliative to address
symptoms caused by model errors; it is neither the problem, nor the solution. For transient climate
experiments with coupled models there is no clearly superior strategy at present, since there are
scientific objections to using flux adjustments but also to not using it.
Model groups that do not adjust the fluxes in their models (or otherwise compensate for drift)
carry out climate change experiments by subtracting the unperturbed climate produced by the
coupled model (with its attendant drift) from the greenhouse perturbed transient climate produced
by the coupled model (also with drift). Since the drift is present in both model runs, this procedure
has the effect of canceling it out. The problem is that the feedbacks operating in the transient model
experiment will be distorted by the presence of the drift as mentioned above. The hope is that the
drift and climate change are small enough that the distortions will also be small. As noted by
Sausen et al. (1988), the “validity of the method is limited to the finite time interval during which
the model control climate has not drifted too far away from the initial (observed) climate state,” but
that this “normally excludes precisely those time scales that one would like to study with a coupled
model.”15
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92.4 The Flux Adjustment Procedure
The actual method of applying flux adjustments to the models varies somewhat from group to
group. Flux adjustment procedures attempt to reconcile the fluxes produced across the atmosphere/
ocean interface by the individual component models when forced by observed boundary conditions
at the interface. If the component model fluxes are not the same when computed in this way, the
coupled model will almost certainly exhibit a climate drift. This is due to the fact that each
component model requires a different flux to achieve an equilibrium from the flux it actually
receives in the coupled system. To provide a more concrete description of flux adjustment we
summarize the procedure as it is implemented at GFDL.16
The atmospheric model is run alone to an equilibrium state using boundary conditions at the
ocean-atmosphere interface supplied by observations (observed SST and sea ice in this case). The
average seasonal and geographic distributions of the fluxes of heat and moisture are calculated over
the last 10 annual cycles. The corresponding distribution of the surface momentum flux is also
computed for use as a boundary condition for the ocean-only integration. In the ocean-only
integration the ocean model is “spun up” towards equilibrium with the surface temperature and
salinity relaxed toward seasonally and geographically varying observed values. The average
seasonal and geographic distributions of the fluxes of heat and moisture needed to maintain the
imposed distributions of SST, surface salinity, and sea ice are computed from the last 500 annual
cycles. To reconcile the fact that the fluxes of heat and moisture computed in the atmosphere-only
integration with realistic SST and sea ice differ from the fluxes of heat and moisture needed to
maintain realistic surface conditions in the ocean-only integration, a flux adjustment is performed
when the component models are coupled together. In this case, the fluxes of heat and moisture in
the atmospheric component of the coupled model are modified by amounts equal to the difference
between the two sets of fluxes derived in the single component integrations. The adjustment of the
flux depends on season and geographical location, but does not change from year to year.
Regardless of how the flux adjustment is implemented, it is partly dependent on the boundary
conditions used to spin up the ocean models. The common Haney (or Newtonian) method of
restoring the ocean surface fluxes of heat (or moisture in equivalent formulations) to climatology
via an equation of the form: H(To) = k(Tcl  – To)  is problematic in that it cannot give both the right
temperatures and the right flux. Consider the two extreme cases: When the model ocean surface
temperature, To, matches climatology, Tcl, Haney restoration to climatology will give zero flux,
which has to be wrong. Conversely, if the model has the right flux, it cannot have the right
temperatures. The models tend to suffer from the first of these two afflictions, i.e., right
temperature and wrong flux. This occurs because the relaxation times used in the models are much
shorter than the advection time scale in the real ocean, and so the models relax quickly to the
climatological temperature fields.17 In principle, the ocean models ought to use specified surface
fluxes as boundary conditions, since the heat, moisture, and momentum capacities of the oceans
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greatly exceeds those of the atmosphere. This has the difficulty that it produces an extremely
unrealistic thermocline in practice, and that the observed fluxes are poorly known, though these
can be partly constrained from the observed transports.18
2.5 Errors Introduced by Flux Adjustment
The flux adjustment procedure can introduce additional errors into the model simulation that
would not be present in a non-flux-adjusted model.19 The problem occurs because the equilibrium
flux adjustment technique is designed to remove the model’s drift, yet some of that drift should
legitimately occur because the present climate is not in equilibrium with the post-industrial increase
of greenhouse gases. The problem that the present climate is not in equilibrium with present
greenhouse gas concentrations is known as the “cold start” problem in climate simulations, and
requires that the model transient simulations start earlier in the century in order to simulate the
correct warming rate at the present time.20 If a climate model transient simulation starts from an
equilibrium climate at the present time, then its initial trend must be zero. Since the real climate
system is already responding to past increases in greenhouse gases with a non-zero present trend,
a climate model run initiated in this way must therefore underestimate the initial trend and is said to
suffer from a “cold start.”
Schneider (1996) uses a simple model to show that while the error introduced into a linear
system by the cold start initial condition error “decreases to zero with a time scale related to the
relaxation time of the climate system, the error introduced by equilibrium flux correction to the
current climate remains finite forever and is independent of the initial conditions.”21. That is, the
cold start initial condition error will eventually be forgotten as the climate simulation progresses
and the response of the model approaches the response that would have occurred if the initial trend
was not underestimated. The flux adjustment procedure introduces an error because the
adjustments are calculated on the basis of a fictitious equilibrium climate. The fluxes are adjusted to
ensure that the coupled model reproduces the present climate state, but do not take account of the
fact that the present climate is not in equilibrium, but is undergoing forcing. The equilibrium flux
adjustment is therefore guaranteed to be inappropriate. Furthermore, since the flux adjustment is
maintained throughout the simulation, the model error introduced by flux adjustment is also
maintained. This error will serve to distort some of the feedbacks in the model, and so it is not
strictly true, as sometimes claimed (e.g., Sausen et al., 1988), that the flux adjustment does not
change the dynamical behaviour of the model.
2.6 Flux Adjustment and Tuning
Some of the general circulation modelers (GCMers) we surveyed view flux adjustment as just
another way their model is “tuned” to the current climate. Viewed this way, flux adjustment is not
unusual and is perhaps even inevitable, since all climate models must be tuned to some degree. In
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the tuning process, model parameter values are adjusted over plausible ranges of their uncertainty
(consistent with observations and/or theory). So long as parameter values remain inside plausible
ranges, tuning does not violate known physical laws. However, flux adjustments as currently
implemented in coupled climate models violate the conservation laws of heat, moisture, and
momentum, and therefore have no physical basis. This would rule out flux adjustment as a
defensible form of tuning.
2.7 Rationale for Flux Adjustment
Most modelers who have used flux adjustment have also provided a rationale to support its use
(see column one, Table 2, which summarises the responses we received to the questions in
Box 1). We have encountered at least two different rationales for using flux adjustments. The
first rationale, as introduced by Sausen et al. (1988), is that the method is valid so long as the
adjustment terms are small. In practice the adjustments are as large as the actual fluxes
themselves,22 which would seem to invalidate use of the method according to this criterion. The
caveat that the flux errors need to be small has not received much attention in subsequent papers
discussing use of the procedure. Indeed, none of the scientists in our survey indicated that they had
made any tests of this assumption (see Table 2).
A second rationale for the validity of the method introduced by some of the modelers is that the
flux adjustment is legitimate if the individual component models (atmosphere and ocean) are
reasonably good at simulating the present climate. The very fact that the coupled models need flux
adjustments of order 100% suggests a priori that there is a problem with the atmosphere and ocean
model component simulations. Furthermore, the ocean component models are using boundary
conditions to spin up the ocean models that cannot be right (as discussed in sections 2.4 and 2.5),
and this will prejudice the performance of the coupled model system. In addition, testing the
component models does not test the feedbacks and interactions that only come into play in the fully
coupled system. According to studies with simple coupled models, these feedbacks do affect the
system’s climate sensitivity.23
It is also debatable whether the individual component models do a good job of simulating the
present climate. Some of the modelers seem to accept at face value the simulation of the model
means and seasonal cycle as fair tests of the models.24 Yet, the atmospheric models are run with
climatological sea surface temperatures, and are therefore forced to get about the right mean and
seasonal cycle of temperature. A more realistic test of the atmospheric models is to check whether a
model gets the temperatures right for the right reasons. That is, does the model simulate the
different components of the heat balance correctly, such as the top of atmosphere (TOA) fluxes and
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transports. Stone and Risbey25 and Gleckler et al.26 show that the atmospheric models have gross
discrepancies in their TOA fluxes, atmospheric transports, and implied ocean transports. The ocean
models are run alone using artificial techniques that restore their temperature and salinity fields
towards observations as discussed above, which compromises the test of means and seasonal cycle
for these models when run this way as well.
Table 2. Summary of Responses to the Questions Posed to the Sample
Modeler
Is the rationale
for flux
adjustment
given?
(Question 2)a
Have tests of
the sensitivity
to errors been
conducted?
(Question 4)
Have tests of
the linearity
assumption
been made?
(Question 5)
Is resolution
considered
to help flux
adjustments?
(Question 8)
What are the
main sources
of errors?
(Question 7)
Purist or
Pragmatist
I N/A
 b Yes No Yes + clouds clouds purist
K Yes (not possible) (not possible) Yes clouds pragmatist
H Yes No No
 c
No clouds pragmatist
F Yes —b — — — pragmatist
B Yes Yes No Yes boundary
layer, clouds
pragmatist
L N/A Yes — — — purist (?)
N Yes — — — clouds purist (?)
R Yes No No Yes pragmatist
S No No No Yes clouds, subgrid
transport in
OCGM
N/A
T No No No Yes Boundary
layer, clouds
N/A
D Yes — — — — ?
G N/A — — Yes — purist
Summary
of
Responses
Most
modelers
who have
used flux
adjustments
have also
provided a
rationale.
Mixed set of
responses. Some
have done
preliminary tests,
others have not;
others say that
such tests are
impossible.
No modelers
have attempted
to test this
assumption.
There is
disagreement
about whether
such a test is in
fact possible.
Almost all
believe that
increasing
resolution
will reduce
flux
adjustment.
All respondents
point to the
central import-
ance of the
representation
of clouds as a
source of errors.
a The question numbers refer to the list of questions in Box 1  (page 5).
Answers to Question 1 all confirmed the objective use of flux adjustments (as defined in the question).
Answers to Questions 3 and 6 were generally not provided. Not all respondents provided sufficient information to be
included in the table.
b N/A: not applicable; — indicates that the respondent did not provide a clear answer.
c (would require much better paleoclimate data)
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2.8 Flux Adjustment and Climate Change
Sausen et al. (1988) and other modelers claim that the flux adjustments “have no influence on
the dynamics of the system in climate response or sensitivity experiments” because the “constant
additive fluxes cancel when considering the deviations of the climate state relative to some reference
state.”27 The extent to which this is true will depend on the magnitude of the errors introduced into
the model simulation by use of the equilibrium flux adjustment procedure as discussed above. Even
if it were the case that the flux adjustment did not introduce any additional distortions in the model
feedbacks (as the non flux adjusted technique does), this misses the point that the feedbacks would
still be distorted in the model by the underlying errors causing the model drift.
In order to obtain a correct simulation of climate change by using a model with flux
adjustments, one must assume that the erroneous model processes causing the original coupled
model to drift do not contribute to any of the feedback processes in the model. This assumption is
prima-facie weak, and has been shown to be wrong for most kinds of model errors by Marotzke
and Stone.28 They use a simple coupled model to show that even though the correct mean state
may have been obtained by flux adjustments at the sea surface, the transient behaviour of the model
is erroneous. They also show that the correct stability behaviour of the model can be recaptured if
the conventional additive scheme is replaced by appropriate alternative schemes. Since the
conventional additive flux adjustment scheme leaves the feedbacks associated with fluxes that have
erroneous representations uncorrected, it is not much of a saving grace to argue that the model has
the same wrong feedbacks as in the unadjusted version of the model. As indicated in Table 2,
whilst some modelers have conducted preliminary tests of the model’s sensitivity to errors, others
have not and others do not believe such tests are possible.
Some modelers have pointed to an apparent agreement between the results of flux adjusted and
non flux adjusted models as indicating that the adjustment does not significantly affect the climate
simulation.29 This also misses the point that there are underlying errors in the models which are
present whether the models use flux adjustments or not. In fact, warming trends predicted by
coupled A/O GCMs differ substantially.30 There are a number of reasons for this, including use of
models with different sensitivities and different rates of mixing of heat into the deep ocean, and
different trace gas increase scenarios. Until recently there were no “clean” comparisons that used
the same coupled A/O GCM and same scenario, with and without flux adjustments. Analyses with
simpler coupled A/O models certainly show a difference if the integrations are started from the
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current climate.31 However, more recently a clean comparison using an A/O GCM has been
conducted. This study, using the Hadley Centre Model HADCM2, found that the:
... global-average temperature response of our model to CO2 increasing at 1% per year
is about 30% less without flux adjustment than with flux adjustment. The geographical
patterns of the response are similar, indicating that flux adjustment is not causing any
gross distortion. ... Although the response in both cases lies within the generally
accepted range for the climate sensitivity, systematic uncertainties of this size are clearly
undesirable, and the best strategy for future development is to improve the climate model
in order to reduce the need for flux adjustment. 32
This study indicates that the earlier intuition that models with and without flux adjustment
would agree may not be a robust one. Another recent study by Fanning and Weaver31 using an
idealized coupled model also finds that the global response in a model with and without flux
adjustment differs. Unlike the HADCM2 study, however, Fanning and Weaver find that the
regional response also differs. If this proves to be a more general finding it is important since a
major rationale for using GCMs is that they—unlike simpler models—have the potential to provide
detailed regional simulations. Where even the global response is concerned, however, it is unclear
whether and how model errors and artificial adjustments on regional scales might influence the
global response. One modeler, for example, stated: “if the atmosphere gets its interactions with the
ocean wrong in one of the critical areas (like the places where the ocean convects) one can
potentially change the gross, i.e. global behaviour” [G].
2.9 Progress Towards Solutions
The only real solution to model drift is to find the underlying causes for the errors and reduce
them to the point where the drift and flux errors are small. Kerr cites one modeler to the effect that
“large flux adjustments may soon be a thing of the past, thanks to increases in computer power.”33
Many of our respondents were confident that increasing resolution would inter alia reduce flux
adjustments (see Table 2). This optimism is sometimes based on plots of annual zonal mean flux
adjustments for updated versions of the models, which do show large reductions. However, zonal
averaging may result in substantial cancellation of errors around a latitude circle, and annual
averaging may mask errors at seasonal time scales. For instance, in the case of the UKMO model
(version UKTR) though higher resolution reduces flux errors in average representations, there are
still many regions in the model where the flux adjustment is of order 100%.34
Furthermore, Gleckler and Taylor find that for the ECMWF model, convergence of ocean
surface heat fluxes is not achieved by T106 resolution, which is substantially greater resolution
than is routinely used by present climate models.35 Thus, there are reasons to be cautious about the
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rate at which model drift will likely be reduced by increasing the model resolution. All our
respondents pointed to the representation of clouds as presenting the greatest source of errors,
though parameterising the boundary layer and sub-grid transport in OGCMs, were also mentioned
(see Table 2). This list is consistent with the factors identified in the IPCC’s Second Assessment
Report 1995.
3. WHY IS FLUX ADJUSTMENT USED OR NOT?
The above section suggests that there is no scientifically “correct” answer to the flux adjustment
issue. The scientific arguments for and against its use are clearly articulated and the dilemma that
there is no simple correct answer to the question of whether flux adjustment should be used in
future projections of climate change is widely acknowledged. Based on our survey, moreover, it
appears (somewhat surprisingly we think) that climate modelers tend to agree on the reasons why
flux adjustment is used, as well as accepting most of the arguments for and against its use. The
question therefore emerges, why do some modelers use adjustments, while others do not?
3.1 Different Interpretations of the Same Model Errors
Disagreement among GCMers seems to arise from different interpretations of the implications
of flux adjustment for the reliability of climate models. The advocates of using flux adjustment
argue along the lines of respondent F:
… if modelers have good reason to believe that the individual AGCMs or OGCMs are
reasonably correct physically, they are justified in coupling the two together to look at
the response of the coupled system to external forcing, even though the coupled system is
not able to reproduce the mean climate system correctly. The response characteristics are
governed by the (tested) response characteristics of each individual system and are
independent of the problem that the overall system is only weakly stabilized and is
therefore difficult to tune to reproduce the observed climate. [F]
Yet as noted in section 2 one of the prime areas of disagreement between scientists is precisely
whether the simulation of mean climate by current AGCMs and OGCMs is indeed adequate. As
one scientist critical of the use of flux adjustments argued:
… the oceanographic models that are coupled to the atmospheric ones are so primitive
 that I have no confidence in any integration carried out for longer than a year or two. [G]
It appears that we can identify two groups of scientists who use different standards which we
dub “the pragmatists” and “the purists.” We introduce these categories to describe the situation in
the debate over flux adjustment, but we also argue that with some minor modification they do have
wider applicability in describing different approaches to climate modeling. The pragmatists are
those modelers who use flux adjustments in coupled A/O GCMs in climate change work. They
tend to accept that the current AGCMs and OGCMs produce sufficiently good simulations to
permit meaningful coupling to take place. This decision depends in part on what criteria are used to
assess the adequacy of the simulation, but such criteria are rarely fully explicated.
By contrast the purists, who tend to avoid and criticise the use of flux adjustments, do not fall
into one tidy group. Some seem primarily interested in how well the model simulates the dynamical
features of the circulation and apply seemingly more rigorous, yet still private and informal,
standards of model adequacy. Other purists are more interested in the model’s simulation of energy
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fluxes, i.e. its thermodynamics. While the pragmatists tend to be reasonably satisfied with the
AGCM’s largely successful simulation of surface temperatures, the purists note that the
pragmatists do not typically pay attention to transport statistics that show errors as large as 50% in
meridional heat transport, which would imply corresponding errors in the surface heat fluxes.25,26
It would be quite misleading, however, to suggest that the pragmatists are unaware of the
problems with their models. It is rather that they do not consider the problems to be so significant
as to invalidate the use of GCMs for climate change experiments.36 The lack of agreed-upon
standards provides some flexibility in the assessment of a model’s control simulation, a flexibility
which can justify the use of models (as producing a sufficiently good control simulation) in climate
change experiments. Alternatively it can be used to justify the need for further model developments
and improvements prior to more applied work.
It is not possible for us to state precisely what these different criteria and standards are because
they are part of the informal tacit knowledge of particular scientific cultures. These enculturated
rules and standards determine what work is considered worthwhile, and what is considered to be a
successful piece of work. They are determined in part by scientific practices and arguments which
are routinised within institutions; they come to be taken for granted, and are used without the
explicit critical scrutiny which is the hallmark of science. Such routinised knowledge and practice
are, however, necessary to any scientific practice since too much questioning and skepticism could
paralyze practice and innovation.
A good example of routinised practice is the use of boundary conditions to force A and O
GCMs; the resulting simulations follow, to some extent, from the specification of the boundary
conditions. Modelers are at one level aware of this limit to the independent evaluation of GCMs;
yet at another, more practically relevant level, they do not allow such questions to change their
everyday work—the simulations they plan, how they interpret them, and so on. A second example
is the assumption that the model’s response to the doubling of CO2 will occur in approximately the
same linear regime as the current climate state. Not only is this assumption implicit when flux
adjustments are used, but it has also been a routine assumption in climate change experiments using
AGCMs (coupled to more or less simple ocean models) for many years. As respondent F put it:
This has been standard procedure in AGCM modeling for many years, prior to the
introduction of flux correction in coupled models. For example, if one uses an AGCM
alone, even with prescribed SST, the atmospheric temperatures can show errors of a few
degrees in various parts of the globe. It is none the less permissible to use the
atmospheric model to determine the change in the atmospheric circulation induced, for
example, by a change of the SST distribution—even when the change is smaller than the
error of the model—provided the model is in the correct linear regime. [F]
While these may be valid assumptions, there is little formal justification to be found in the
published literature, though we know of two supporting studies.37 It appears to be a pragmatically
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necessary article of faith and not obviously denied by experience. As one, purist climate scientist
put it:
The people doing the CO2 doubling and related studies like to claim ... that even though
the mean state is artificially maintained, that the perturbations will still be realistic.
I know of no actual demonstration that this is true. It is easy to construct counter
examples, at least as thought experiments. [G]
Indeed, none of the climate modeling Centers which responded to our survey have attempted to
test the key assumption of linearity which is a necessary condition for flux adjustments to be
legitimate (see Table 2). In fact there was skepticism over whether any such tests are currently
available. Some purist modelers worry that the linear assumption is valid, however, only if the
drift in the model is slow and continuous. In some coupled runs without flux adjustments, the drift
changes rapidly for no known reason; e.g., there have been periods of sudden warming in one
coupled control run [D, 15 April 1994]. These purist modelers also ask whether the climate
sensitivity of the model changes if you apply a small perturbation rather than a large one (ibid.).
Certain tacit assumptions and practices have become routine in GCM studies, and these have
been extended to coupled models without any serious questioning of their validity in this new
context. Such exploratory and often ambitious extension of concepts and practices to new contexts
is typical and probably necessary in most scientific practice.38 At the same time, however, past
case studies have shown how the policy and political significance of extension increases when
public policy commitments could be based on the resulting knowledge.39
We are not suggesting here that pragmatic modelers are simply “duped” into using flux
adjustment through adoption of existing criteria and standards. They, and the purists, are also
informed by their own ideas and experience of how models can best be evaluated or tested and
improved (though these perceptions may also be shaped by routinised expectations). The
pragmatists tend to argue that despite the errors the best way to improve knowledge is to go ahead
and couple models together, using flux adjustments to get a realistic response. This is for them
more desirable than waiting until models and observations have improved sufficiently that flux
adjustments are not needed, since that:
… implies that we cannot learn anything without our models “being perfect.” This is
clearly not the case and stultifies the search for new understanding of the climate system
while leaving estimates of potential climate change to less sophisticated approaches. [M]
It is even argued by some modelers that it is precisely in the coupling of models together that
their individual errors become most apparent, and thus capable of being addressed in further
                                                                                                                                                            
Takahashi, T. (eds.), Geophysical Monograph 29, AGU, Washington, D.C., pp. 130-163) shows that the
response of global mean surface temperature in an AGCM to a doubling of CO2 is linear. North, G. Yip,
K.J., Leung L.-Y., and Chervin, R.: 1992 “Forced and Free Variations of the Surface Temperature Field in a
GCM,” (J. Climate, 5, 227-239) shows that the regional response of the surface temperature to various idealized
forcings in an idealized AGCM are linear to a good approximation.
38
 Schon, D.: 1963, Invention and the Evolution of Ideas, London: Tavistock.
39
 Cf. Wynne, B.: 1991, “After Chernobyl: Science Made too Simple,” New Scientist, 26th January 1991;
Wynne, B.: 1996, “May the Sheep Safely Graze? A Reflexive View of the Expert-lay Knowledge Divide,” in
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research [Q]. Yet, there is a serious dilemma here since (as noted in Section 2) the pragmatists also
state, at least sometimes, that flux adjustment is only legitimate if the simulation by the component
models is sufficiently accurate. Hence, the argument about coupling as a way of learning more
about component model errors (and therefore improving them) potentially threatens the legitimacy
of using flux adjustments for generating projections of climate change (if it implies that the
uncoupled models are substantially inaccurate).
Another modeler also used a comparative perspective in assessing A/O GCMs with flux
adjustment:
I do think that the models using flux corrections have some skill. They clearly represent
an improvement to the slab ocean models used before. The worst effect of using flux
correction is to give the feeling that the models are realistic—and to delay research
concerning a number of physical features. Let us consider clouds. You can correct easily
the absence of low cloudiness through flux correction. In your experiments you then
implicitly assume that low clouds are unchanged. This is certainly wrong. At the same
time, as the parameterisation of low clouds appears difficult, using flux correction is a
good way to delay the moment we will have to face this issue. [N]
The two modelers quoted above (M and N) both accept that using flux adjustments has some
pragmatic validity, but appear to disagree on the extent to which it should continue to be used in the
future. The argument against using it is that further understanding will not emerge until the models
are improved such that they do not require flux adjustments. Use of flux adjustment, according to
N, may act to conceal the model’s errors and to lull the modeler into a false belief that the model’s
performance is better than it really is. Note, however, that this is a social judgment about how
scientists interpret models, and about how they act on that interpretation. It suggests that scientists’
use of flux adjustment may well (for whatever reason) all too easily cover-up model errors, thus
obstructing scientific learning.
We also want to draw attention to the significance in modeling and model evaluation of
expectations about how the science will unfold, and about how performance of supporting
technologies (e.g., computer power) will develop. There was an informal belief at a number of
modeling Centers in the early- to mid-1990s that increased model resolution would reduce the need
for flux adjustments (also see the responses to our survey, Table 2).40 Even when individual
experiments had shown this not to be the case, the belief that increased resolution would be a major
means by which flux adjustment would be reduced was still stated to us.41 This has to be seen in
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 An internal report at one Center noted the scale of flux adjustment in an early 1990s coupled model run and
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undesirably large horizontal viscosity in order to achieve computational stability” (page 1, Murphy, J.: 1991,
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the context of the routinised faith in the last 20 or 30 years that increased computer power would be
available in the immediate future, often at exponential rates of increase, and that this would in turn
lead to better GCMs, especially for Numerical Weather Prediction (NWP), but also for climate
change. Faith in the development of computer power is largely justified by experience, but this
does not mean that flux adjustments will be reduced by increased resolution.42 Other sociological
studies of modeling have illustrated that model improvements in the here-and-now, and hopes of
future improvements, are frequently confused.43 Thus the expectation that higher resolution would
lead to less need for flux adjustment was arguably important in legitimatizing the present use and
policy authority of existing models.
But what explains why some climate modelers adopt a purist as opposed to a pragmatist
stance? Below we identify four factors which we believe help account for the difference. The first
is institutional mission and funding. The second, which is closely connected with the first, is the
relationship of the modeling to policy making processes. The third is the relationship between the
modeling and how the model output is used. The fourth is the “style” of climate modeling, which
relates to different disciplinary, institutional and personal career trajectory backgrounds.
3.2 Institutional Mission and Funding
Identifying the intended purpose of the climate research goes some way towards clarifying the
different perspectives of the purists and pragmatists. The purists are principally interested in
analysing, developing and improving state-of-the-art climate models for the purpose of developing
a better representation of the key processes involved in climate and climate change. They are less
interested in climate change projections for policy, which they regard as requiring improved
models, and they do not restrict the potential application of their models to studies of anthropogenic
climate change. Many are concerned with academic questions concerning physical processes in the
atmosphere and ocean, which they use models to study as and when appropriate. Flux adjustment
appears, to them, as an unscientific fix, because it actually obscures the errors which can (if clearly
defined) give clues to the interesting and productive research questions. Hence, to them, “covering
up” those errors denies one of the key means by which research advances.
On the other hand, the pragmatists are much more involved in using and applying models for
various purposes usually concerned with the study of past and/or future climate change, and
especially in assessments of anthropogenically-induced climate change. The pragmatists’ mission is
tightly linked to current policy, political and public concerns surrounding the enhanced greenhouse
effect (not necessarily directly but mediated by funding agencies and government departments, as
will be discussed). They use models which are as near the state-of-the-art as possible, given the
need for a model which can provide answers about anthropogenic climate change.
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It might seem obvious that the best climate models should be used for policy-relevant climate
change experiments, meaning the most complex and highest-resolution models. However, the
computer time required to run a GCM increases steeply with added complexity. The computer
requirements of coupled A/O GCMs for a climate change simulation of say 100 years are already
massive, taking several months on large supercomputers. The pragmatist modeler has to ask what
is being gained through including such complexity and higher resolution, and this is frequently a
difficult question to answer in a straightforward way. What is clear to pragmatists, however, is that
empirical or theoretical validation of the more complex parameterisations is rarely available. While
many feel intuitively that as high as possible a resolution is required, straightforward evidence that
increasing the resolution improves the ability of the model to simulate processes most important to
climate change is not readily available.44
A further complication for pragmatists wishing to use more complex models is that GCMs tend
to come as a package in which the parameterisations, resolution, input variables and tuning are co-
generated and interconnected through a process of internal mutual adjustment. Changing just one
of them is unlikely to improve the model, in fact it often makes the model worse, because it puts
the system components “out of kilter” with one another. But changing each part of the model is a
large task, and one that requires a dedicated model development effort, of the sort that some of the
purists are engaged in. Thus engaging in model development and testing militates against actually
doing climate change simulations since the available resources are generally not capable of
supporting fully both kinds of efforts. Also, improving the A/O GCMs used in transient climate
change runs is not an incremental process. Rather, improvement requires a considerable leap in
complexity, and such advances do not occur in a predictable fashion. The pragmatists recognise
most of the limitations of their current models, but there may be little alternative available to them if
they intend to conduct assessments of anthropogenic climate change over the next 50–100 years.
Use of flux adjustment appears to reduce the need for computer resources and this may be an
important, though not usually acknowledged, reason why flux adjustment proved popular with the
major climate change modeling Centers in the late 1980s and early 1990s. For example, at Center 3,
where flux adjustment was not used, the modelers found that they had to perform many short runs
with their coupled model in order to test out different tunings, as described in an interview:
It [the coupled A/O GCM] took over a year of tuning. Each time you change something
you have to run the model for at least 5 years … And you say that isn’t quite the right
thing to do, and you have to go back and change something else and then you say
perhaps it wasn’t quite long enough and you run it for 10 years. … So the tuning
exercise can be very long and painful and takes up a lot of resources and it’s unclear at
lots of times what you have to do. [D, 15 April 1994]
This level of tuning was not necessary with the flux adjusted models, because flux adjustment
removes much of the drift created in model coupling. Hence, by using flux adjustment the
pragmatists could proceed more rapidly with the long transient climate change simulations.
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Furthermore, some pragmatist modelers have stated that a major rationale for using flux adjustment
has been to bring the atmosphere and ocean models into equilibrium more rapidly. As one put it
during an interview:
… If you use these flux correction techniques you can then get the ocean into
equilibrium much quicker than without them. And that’s probably a main motivation [for
initially using corrections]. You have a very long thermal inertia in the ocean. Now there
are ways of speeding the deep ocean up. Strictly speaking they’re only valid if you don’t
have a seasonal cycle. … Getting the deep ocean into equilibrium is an issue which is
not totally divorced from flux correction because by specifying the ocean … constraining
the surface temperatures and salinities when you run the model does tend to bring the
model into equilibrium much quicker. [B, 11 March 1993]
To observe the relevance of this simple distinction of key objectives and mission, consider the
comments of the following pragmatist modeler concerning the consequences of climate drift in
coupled models:
We do know that substantial distortion is likely to result if the adverse effects of climate
drift are not ameliorated. Can we trust numerical experiments which do not use flux
adjustments or its equivalent? [K]
The critical question here, though, is “trust” for what purpose? While K is referring to
assessments of the anthropogenic greenhouse effect, a purist might want to question whether we
can put all that much trust in the future projections of any numerical experiments with current
models, irrespective of whether flux adjustment is used or not (which is not to say that he or she
denies the importance of the anthropogenic greenhouse effect).
In effect, there are two somewhat independent stages of evaluation involved here. There is the
first-stage evaluation of the component A and OGCMs with respect to their adequacy for climate
change simulations. Purists generally would find the models inadequate, and pragmatists would
find them adequate. However, once an A/O GCM is actually in use for climate change simulations
it has effectively been decided that the component models were adequate. Hence the second-stage
evaluation concerns whether flux adjustments should be used or not, once closure has been
reached on the question of the adequacy of A/O GCMs. At this second-stage some purists might
accept the need for flux adjustments given the prior decision (which they would not accept) of
component A and OGCM adequacy. Those purists who do actually couple together A and OGCMs
appear to be less willing than most pragmatists to close-down the first-stage evaluation of
component models and the perceived extent of the errors makes them reluctant to use flux
adjustment since this simply obscures these errors rather than helping eradicate them.
Many climate change modeling centers do not have the luxury of devoting all or most of their
time to model development and production of control runs to the standard they might like. They are
compelled for reasons of funding obligations, pressure from funding agencies and government
departments, and/or to some extent compel themselves for reasons of desired high public status
and public relevance, or more mundanely, in order to pursue a particular trajectory in climate
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research upon which they have embarked (and have invested resources in), to use coupled A/O
GCMs in climate change prediction experiments.45 As respondent O put it:
In my group we provide climate change scenarios for decision makers now, so we cannot
afford to say to governments: “We cannot give you advice from GCMs because they have
a flux correction, and that is possibly hiding errors in the GCMs.” Rather, we have to
take the results from flux-corrected and non-flux-corrected GCMs and make our own
judgments as to which is better for the purpose of giving advice now. If a flux-correction
enables us to get a reasonable answer, caveats and all, then we use it, but state the
caveats. If and where we know the flux corrections give seriously misleading answers,
then we do not advocate using them. [O]
Such different institutional raisons d’être affect the criteria for evaluating models. Modeler O
made a useful distinction between Type I and Type II Error Science. In O’s own words:
… please distinguish between doing ideal “good science” which has no time constraints
and aims at the 95% or 99% confidence level (Type I Error science) and practically-
oriented pro-tem [“for the moment”] science aimed at providing timely advice in areas
of social responsibility where decision-making is needed despite uncertainty. This
requires consideration of Type II errors also, i.e., what is the chance of rejecting a
correct theory because it cannot be established at the 95% or 99% probability level? …
[Such science] must focus on the best interim advice, uncertainties, caveats, and all. The
longer-term development of “pure” science requires more stringent standards, but may
be less useful for urgent decision-making. [O]
Thus the policy-defined rationale and expected use of the model shapes the criteria used to
assess scientific practices and knowledge-claims.
3.3 The Role of Policy Processes
Without flux adjustment the credibility for policy makers of the output from running coupled
A/O GCMs might be seriously threatened because of the drift (and this may limit the period of time
during which it is sensible to run the model). How plausible is it, though, to suggest that the
concerns of policy makers for long-term scenarios may be one factor which has swayed modelers
in deciding to use flux adjustment? We do not have any direct empirical evidence to support such a
claim, and in any case we feel that if it occurs, it does so through indirect influences more than via
explicit policy-led demand. Such indirect avenues could operate via research funding
agencies—especially when such agencies are also government departments—and through indirect
pressure from scientists’ participation in policy-orientated scientific assessment organizations,
especially the IPCC. To the extent that institutions like the IPCC and its deliberations constitute an
important arena for negotiation of status, credibility, and influence, perceptions of policy needs are
built seamlessly into scientific interactions. Internal and external audiences for scientific research
become blurred.
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GCMers may, in short, come to feel that realistic scenarios of future climate change are a
necessary research output, to feed into the IPCC and similar scientific assessment processes. The
advisory scientists are influenced by their understandings of what the policy world and research
agencies desire from them, and by the competitive dynamic instituted by the IPCC, in which the
policy-oriented modeling groups aim to be the first (or at least close runners-up) to present some
new modeling work which is seen to have policy significance.46 In this context, the ability of flux
adjustments to reduce the computer resources needed to get the coupled model into equilibrium was
an important advantage in the early- to mid-1990s, when some national funding agencies were
clamouring for state-of-the-art model runs to feed into their national negotiating positions and into
the IPCC’s scientific assessment (specifically the supplementary report of 1992 and the second
assessment review of 1995). Hence, scientific managers and advisory scientists, especially those
involved in the IPCC, have an important role in deciding for modelers what counts as policy
significant as well as what needs to be known urgently.47
Some modelers seem to recognise the benefits of flux adjustment to outside audiences. As one
more purist modeler put it:
It’s more politically pleasing to show flux corrected results because in the control run the
model looks like the observations. [D, 15 April 1994]
We speculate that long-term projections are seen by (some) modelers to be needed by the policy
community, even urgently as modeler [O] expressed it above. Policy responses to climate change,
even in the short-term, depend for their justification upon medium- to long-term projections. So, for
instance, the proposal of the European Union at the December 1997 Climate Convention in Kyoto
to reduce emissions of greenhouse gases by 15% by the year 2010 would not be credible without
the existence of longer-term projections. This is because it is only in the medium- to long-term (say
30–100 years plus) that global climate change comes to look obviously significant to nonspecialists,
i.e., the anthropogenic signal has by this stage clearly emerged from the noise of natural variability
and the impacts loom larger. Long-term projections are also required to assess the mitigative effects
of proposed short-term emission reduction policies. In the early- to mid-1990s, long-term
projections of GCMs hardly seemed serious in policy terms unless flux adjustment was employed.
Such projections in turn support policy approaches which assume that reasonably certain
knowledge of the medium- to long-term future is available for planning purposes.
Hence, the scientifically do-able problem and the needs of policy may have been constructed
together, and the validation of flux adjustments as a technique cannot, we suggest, be divorced
entirely from policy requirements. Use of flux adjustments therefore may imply an implicit model
                                                
46
 A case in point is the competition between the two major European climate modeling Centers to provide new
findings of policy significance and use prior to the April 1995 First Meeting of the Parties to the Framework
Convention on Climate Change in Berlin (in that instance relating to the role of sulphate aerosols).
47
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compelling to the policy maker and extend to the time of CO2 doubling.
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of policy, and of its knowledge-needs; likewise, policy may contain an implicit version of what is
credible and good science in the climate change modeling domain (see Figure 1).
long term climate
 projection is desirable
development of a global 
climate change policy
SCIENCE POLICY
flux adjustment
used in A/O GCMs
long term climate 
projection is do-able
(advisers)
Figure 1. The mutual influence of science and policy in the field of climate change
modeling. Direction of arrow indicated the key message received by one group from
another: e.g., modelers receive message from policy (via advisers) that long term
climate projection is a desirable policy-deliverable.
3.4 The Role of Requests from Scientific Users of GCM Output
According to several of our respondents, climate impacts scientists have exerted a significant
pressure on GCMers to provide scenarios of future climate change. This may have influenced their
decision to use flux adjustment in two ways. Firstly, time-dependent scenarios require the use of
coupled models; and flux adjustment has been seen as necessary to make such runs appear
realistic. Secondly, according to some GCMers, the impacts community has also demanded a high
quality control simulation. As one put it:
Many of these forces [to use flux correction] come from the impacts community who tend
to hold to the view that a good quality control simulation is a necessary, but not
sufficient, condition for obtaining a good climate change response. We feel that while it
is very satisfying to have a good control climate it is not necessary (but is certainly
desirable). … We are well aware of the requirement that one’s model must remain visible
through use of modeling output by outside users; that these outside users often place a
higher value on the quality of the control climate in small regions means that often a
model may be rejected from further consideration using criteria quite different from that
of the original modeler. [I]
This was confirmed by yet another modeler, who noted during an interview that:
… climate impacts people are much more interested in the flux corrected models because
the observed state looks very close to the model control—for all the wrong reasons but it
looks more pleasing. [D, 15 April 1994]
These sorts of pressures upon modelers could be exerted indirectly, especially through funding
agencies. Yet, while the impacts community may be a significant influence in some national
contexts, in other countries the GCMers are relatively immune from the requests of the impacts
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community.48 To illustrate the divergence in opinion among modelers towards the role of model
users, it is worth mentioning that one respondent thought that model users, through their demands,
could actually help create the circumstances in which model development and improvement would
occur.
3.5 Different Epistemic Styles
Our final explanatory variable refers to differing epistemological approaches to climate modeling,
though both use GCMs. The distinction is between those climate modelers who have always
emphasised the thermodynamical features of the climate system, who tend to be the pragmatists, and
those who emphasize a more dynamical approach to understanding climate change, who tend to be
the purists. All climate specialists are cognisant of the fact that climate is a product of the interaction
of thermodynamics and dynamics, so we are not suggesting that any modelers propose either
dynamics or thermodynamics as the appropriate lens to view the models. Our point is rather the
importance of the relative emphasis on the contribution of each, especially when modelers are
assessing the characteristics and response of the global system as a first approximation.49
For the dynamicist, the need for flux adjustment is a very telling indication of the limitations of
the GCMs which have been used by thermodynamicists to study the transient climate change
response. The underlying causes of the need for flux adjustment are the large model errors which
arise, and which also result in the control simulations of the separate A and O GCMs being poor (in
the purists’ view). The dynamicists look to the low resolution and the relatively simple physical
parameterisations in the A/O GCMs, as the likely explanation for the errors and hence the need for
flux adjustment. For example, oceanographers and purist ocean modelers have tended to look
askance at the low resolution of OGCMs used in anthropogenic climate change experiments. How
can such models produce good simulations, they ask, when their resolution is much larger than the
scale of ocean eddies (important to the transport of energy though just how important is contested) or
of key topographic features of the ocean, which play an important role in ocean circulation patterns?
Thermodynamicists agree that the need for flux adjustment arises because of model-errors, but
they do not have so much confidence that the root problem is dynamical in character, hence do not
automatically believe that increasing resolution or the complexity of parameterisations will improve
things. As they see it, it is largely inevitable that the ocean and atmosphere models do not produce
consistent fluxes. This is partly because the A and OGCMs have been developed independently, with
their separate interrelated tuning, parameterisations, resolution and so on. The flux into the ocean
from the atmosphere or vice versa has not been one of the key constraints guiding the development
(tuning, etc.) of the models. Thus errors are almost inevitable. Also, the thermodynamicists see the
two systems as thermodynamically independent (to a first approximation). If the two systems are
“out of synch” then it is a relatively simple matter of adjusting the “knob” which represents the flux
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between the ocean and atmosphere in order to bring them back into synch. One modeler explicitly
used the comparison of two electrical circuits to explain this:
By using a constant flux one is simply shifting the “working point” of the system. It is like
applying a constant off-set to the mean voltage which drives an electronic amplifier
which is used only to amplify time-variable signals. [F]
This distinction between thermodynamicist and dynamicist approaches is closely related to
work-experience backgrounds, and hence to institutional mission. This, in fact, makes it difficult
to clearly distinguish epistemic styles as an entirely independent variable. The thermodynamicists
are often those who have pioneered the use of GCMs in climate change modeling. The dynamicists
come more from weather forecasting and NWP. They have not populated anthropogenic climate
change studies so much to date because their approach required tools and computer resources
which are only now becoming widely available. At an earlier point, when only low-resolution
coupling of (what dynamicists saw as) poor models with simple physics was possible, the
dynamicists would have ruled out doing anthropogenic climate change experiments as not worth
while. The thermodynamic-pragmatic modelers had, additionally, already occupied the territory of
anthropogenic climate change, but the growing interest in the subject in the late 1980s and early
1990s, and the large influx of resources into the field, made the area increasingly attractive to
dynamicists. Larger computer resources, better observational data-sets and more physically-based
parameterisations were available, allowing more complex, high resolution models to be developed
and run.50
3.6 Summary and Outline Sketches of Selected Modeling Centers
In reality, the above-mentioned factors are interconnected and involved—to a greater or lesser
extent—in each case where decisions to use flux adjustment or not have been made. Scientists have
only so much room for manoeuvre when developing research programs given their skills, know-
how, resources, opportunities for funding and ability to justify the research in terms of wider
societal goals; all these elements must be coordinated and some supporting overlap convincingly
argued for.51
Table 3 attempts to summarize the particular combination of factors operating at a number of
key climate modeling Centers in the early- to mid-1990s. The different organizational cultures of
the four modeling Centers are important though of course not comprehensive factors in
understanding how and why flux adjustment is accepted, or not accepted. There was considerable
discussion among researchers at Center 1 concerning whether to use flux adjustment, and what its
possible effects are, reflecting a strong contingent of dynamically-oriented scientists and a close
relationship to NWP research. However, the collective and hierarchical organization of Center 1
ensured that the decision of the senior staff to use flux adjustment was acceded to. The decision
was heavily influenced by the very close relationship to policy makers in the government agency
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Table 3. Outline Sketches of the Organizational Cultures of Four Climate Modeling Centers†
Center 1 Center 2 Center 3 Center 4
1. Scientific
styles
Mixture of purist and
pragmatist, but
hierarchical
organization and
competition with other
centers favors
pragmatism.
Mixture of purist
and pragmatist.
Pragmatism
favored by
charisma of
leader and
competition.
More strongly purist.
Pragmatism occurs but not
dominant; use of flux
adjustments is more openly
contested internally.
Mixture of purist
and pragmatists.
Charisma of leader
and competition
with others tends
to favor
pragmatism.
2. Institutional
Mission and
Funding
Applied mission to
provide projections to
policy makers, i.e. to
generate “policy
useful” knowledge of
climate change.
Self-imposed
mission to
produce state-
of-art climate
projections for
policy makers
Aims to support the wider
academic community in the
field of climate change.
To produce state-
of- art climate
projections which
raise conceptual
issues, in addition
to being of policy
relevance.
3. Policy
Roles /
Relations
75% funded by
government. Much
cooperative
involvement in research
management from the
main funder. High
visibility in government
policy and media circles.
Close links to IPCC
WGI.
Close links to
IPCC WGI.
High visibility in
government
policy and media
circles.
Controlled by funders and
universities. The clientele is
purist-oriented and this
feeds back onto research
conducted. Pragmatism less
acceptable especially given
relative lack of direct links
to policy; where they occur
they are indirect and
multiple.
Funded by
government
agency, and high
profile in
government, policy
and media circles.
4. Relations
to impacts
community
Close relations.
Equilibrium and now
transient runs from
A/O GCMs provided.
Close relations.
Equilibrium and
now transient
runs from A/O
GCMs provided.
Links with other climate
modelers as important as
those with impacts
community. Hence has
more knowledgeable and
critical “customers” of
model simulations than
those of Centers 1, 2, and 4.
Not especially
close links to
impacts community
at present.
5. Use Flux
Adjustment?
Yes Yes No Yes
† circa the early- to mid-1990s
which funded the Center, and for which senior scientists played an important advisory role, and by
the Center’s commitment to providing policy-useful knowledge to the IPCC WGI. Policy makers
wanted a research product that was effective in policy and political terms, meaning a prediction.
At Center 3 decision-making was relatively more distributed. There separate fiefdoms largely
pursue their own agendas, though the predominantly dynamical-purist modeling culture (which
was reflected in, and reinforced by, the character of the academic climate modeling research
community which was the main client and funder of the Center) was probably the driving influence
behind the decision not to use flux adjustment. In Centers 2 and 4, the dominant role of a single,
charismatic group leader—through which much funding and credibility had been secured
historically—was important; the modelers are likely to have acceded to the preference of this
individual concerning whether or not to use flux adjustment. In both Centers 2 and 4, this
individual was a well-established and highly-regarded thermodynamically-oriented pragmatic
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GCMer and these Centers are also more closely related to policy than Center 3. A further factor in
the case of all Centers was the competition to provide the wider world, and especially the IPCC
WGI, with the latest state-of-the-art model runs, this acting as an indicator of policy usefulness.52
In terms of organizational cultures, the hierarchical and cohesive character of Center 1, which
reflects a long historical legacy, facilitates top-down decision making by senior scientists and
research funders. The fluid boundary between the Center and NWP work permits more purist /
dynamicist scientists to develop alternative connections and networks contributing to the task of
climate change prediction (though still as part and parcel of the same hierarchical culture). Center 3,
by contrast, has much less clearly defined external boundaries, and the active involvement of the
outside academic research community reflects the permeability of the boundary and has a significant
influence upon the internal adoption of a more purist style. Within Center 3, however, the
boundaries are very well defined and reinforced by different sets of outside relationships and the
existence of distinctive modeling styles. Relatively pragmatist and purist approaches become
competitors at Center 3, but the criticism of pragmatism in an organization where power is relatively
distributed appears to influence the modelers working in that style, such that they are less pragmatist
than modelers in Centers 1, 2 and 4. These features help to account for the survival of a relatively
purist-oriented style of modeling in a modeling team which also provides projections to the IPCC.
The manner in which flux adjustment has been handled internally in modeling Centers is also
revealing. For instance, representation of flux adjustments to outsiders by one modeling Center
over a period of a year and a half tended to down-play its significance and implications. Documents
intended for outside consumption, and contract reports to funding agencies, tended to present flux
adjustments as a minor technical issue, the size and non-physical basis of which was not made
clear. For the purposes of internal documentation, however, the more problematic features of flux
adjustment, and the assumptions behind its use, was much more openly acknowledged and
discussed. Even more openness about the indeterminacies occurred during the course of verbal
discussions which we had with modelers. It then became apparent that there was in fact
disagreement within the modeling Center as to the desirability, possible effects and causes of the
need for flux adjustment, as well as how best to attempt to reduce it. The opening up of the
intellectual issue and debate corresponded to journeying from outside the center into its innermost
offices and settings such as the informal morning coffee-break. The more open account of flux
adjustment internally was not considered by the key scientific advisors at the apex of the Center to
be pertinent to the external scientific debate or policy use of that science.
One sees similar internal openness and debate coupled with external communications that tend
to minimize debate in the treatment of flux adjustments in the IPCC process—for example
comparing draft reports with published chapters and policymakers’ summaries.53 There is here not
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 A discussion took place over an early draft of the Executive Summary of Section B of the IPCC 1992 report
which contained two possible versions. Both versions explicitly stated that the models: “continue to display the
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only a simplification, but a translation of flux adjustment into a routine technical problem which
more research within the same trajectory will diminish. We speculate that many advisory scientists’
judgements were influenced both by science (representing the state-of-the-art and frequently tacit
knowledge and understanding within a particular, circumscribed community) and a view of policy
(the need for “closure,” consistency, certainty, rejection of indeterminacy as somehow
irresponsible, a united scientific front, etc.). The definition of do-able problems has both scientific
and policy dimensions to it. Flux adjustment as a scientific issue which is rather indeterminate and
premised on a priori assumptions, may have been regarded as an issue which could all too easily
“blow up” through being misunderstood and not put into the proper context, or through criticisms
from within the wider peer community itself. Meanwhile, in order to maintain legitimacy among
scientific colleagues, a richer and more multidimensional account of the issue is provided in other
places (actually in the same document in the case of IPCC reports).
4. THE POLITICAL CONTEXT OF FLUX ADJUSTMENT
Nearly all our respondent climate modelers stated that flux adjustment is a necessary technique
they would prefer not to have to use. It is no secret within the community that it is an arbitrary and
nonphysical adjustment, which goes against the spirit of physically based modeling. But how
significant is flux adjustment in the wider scheme of things? Some of our respondents regarded
flux adjustment as a relatively minor issue and expected that it would disappear as a problem in the
near future:
As a scientific issue, I think flux correction will wither. I am much more concerned about
the problems of representing clouds, and I suspect that the inaccuracies due to using flux
correction are minor compared to the uncertainties due to cloud. [B]
This [flux adjustment] is just one of many prominent scientific concerns. [C]
Clearly, such respondents were not anxious for flux adjustment to assume importance in
communications with outside audiences. More generally, there appeared to be some anxiety over
how to discuss flux adjustment. Should modelers discuss it in detail and describe it as “arbitrary”
or a “fudge factor,” in which case they risked losing credibility for GCMs as “fudged” or “fixed”
to produce a “correct” answer? In the contentious atmosphere of climate politics, with wealthy
opponents out to deny the IPPC’s claims, this could be risky. Is it not likely to engender
                                                                                                                                                            
same overall strengths and weaknesses identified in the first [1990] assessment” and that “continuing validation
tests indicate a slow but steady upward trend in the confidence which we can attach to their results.” Inserted
between these two statements in version 2, however, was the following addition: “among the major weaknesses
is the need for substantial corrections to the air-sea fluxes in order to reproduce the present climate. The impacts
of these corrections on the ability to model GHG-induced climate change cannot be assessed a priori” (stress
added). Although neither version was eventually used intact, the caveats of version 2 were not included in the
1992 report. Revealingly, a reviewer commented about version 2 that it was “too defensive—not much [has]
changed in validation [since IPCC 1990].” The advisory scientists were perhaps thinking strategically about the
significance of representing quite legitimate scientific reservations about flux adjustment upon the credibility to a
range of political, policy and media audiences of the IPCC reports (and especially the Executive Summary) and
process (e.g., a consistent relation with the IPCC 1990 report was preferred). They may also have been thinking
about how the scientific peer community itself would respond to such flagging of flux adjustments given that
little new validation work had been conducted since the earlier report.
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skepticism in a public not familiar with the full scientific context of climate modeling? As one
scientist put it:
Flux adjustment is only one of the particular features that the climate modeler will assess
in this overall critical process. If a non-modeler is to sensibly take part in the assessment
he needs to understand the whole model and the whole critical process. It is relatively
easy (and not helpful) for non modelers who wish to rubbish the process to pick on
different aspects of model formulation in isolation. [A]
A high level of knowledge and understanding of A/O GCMs is not likely to be imparted in a
short communication. Even purist and dynamicist modelers seem reluctant to present flux
adjustment in overly-critical tones in public, but rather reserve criticism for internal dealings within
their own peer community. Hence, one purist-oriented researcher responded as follows to our
enquiry by questioning our implicit assumption that flux adjustment was of interest to non-GCMers:
I think a wider public is only interested in knowing how reliable the model scenarios are,
which the IPCC has tried to communicate (and which is quite hard to judge), but they
would hardly want to debate the nitty gritty of running models, like convection
parameterisations, flux corrections, resolution problems, etc. You’d have to know a lot
about models to take part in a discussion of how serious flux corrections are, and I think
the public will probably have to wait until the modelers have discussed this amongst
themselves and have come to some sort of conclusion on this matter. [J]
Such scientists are effectively drawing a strong boundary between science and policy, with
flux adjustment and its implications falling squarely within science. Some scientists appear to view
outside scrutiny of our sort as an implicit threat to proper scientific assessment, and in particular as
an attempt to discredit the A/O GCMs and climate modeling more generally. One of our
respondents took this further by questioning our assumption that there was any public policy issue
involved in the debate over the use of flux adjustment:
… coupled A/O GCMs per se, regardless of whether they are flux corrected or not, have a
minuscule role in the policy debate.54 Their role in the science that feeds into the policy
arena is, likewise, small. The credibility of the science does not depend on these models.
… It [flux adjustment] is only a policy concern in that it may influence opinions of a
minority who feel (or search for evidence that) scientists are somehow downplaying or
hiding model deficiencies. In this sense, the history of how this issue has been presented
is interesting. However, the problem is far more general and widespread than just flux
correction. [C]
The danger of inadvertently assisting the cause of the greenhouse contrarians is clearly
expressed in the above. Since, according to this view, GCMs are relatively uncoupled from the
provision of scientific knowledge for policy, and since flux adjustment is but one of many
scientific concerns surrounding GCMs, then the conclusion is clear:
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By concentrating on such a minor issue you are in danger of, not only not seeing the
wood for the trees, but conveying that blindness to others. [C]
Respondent C is here drawing on a sense of the policy and political implications of a study of
flux adjustments. Though C clearly believes that flux adjustments are a nonissue, and therefore not
relevant to public debate, we encountered other respondents who seemed to go even further in
implying that even if flux adjustments were an issue, the outside world should not be privy to this
information. To many outside the climate field, that scientists have such a highly developed sense
of the policy and political implications arising from scientific issues may seem quite remarkable. It
should come as little surprise, however, given the intense politicization of climate science,
particularly in the USA, but also in the IPCC WGI, where coalitions of contrarian scientists, and
representatives of industry and the oil states, have tried to cast doubt on the scientific case for
climate change by emphasizing imperfections such as flux adjustment. Respondents like C are
drawing upon their experience of working as advisory scientists, especially at the IPCC. Unlike A
and J they perceive the science-policy boundary to be fuzzy in practice if not by preference. Some
respondents implicitly supported the view that advisory scientists should attempt to control the
science-policy interface to limit opportunities for political manipulation while preserving the
authority of science. The dilemma that such policing could also undermine science’s public
credibility through being seen as arbitrary and authoritarian was not acknowledged.
Not all of the responses to our survey were negative in tone, however. Some modelers
welcomed discussing flux adjustment and this seemed related in some cases to personal contacts
and the building-up of trust between ourselves and the respondents. Several respondents thought
that an enquiry such as ours would assist in reducing misunderstanding of flux adjustment among
commentators, policy makers, and model users. One purist-oriented respondent thought that an
enquiry would make the scientific community itself more open to questioning accepted wisdom and
practice and to promoting the removal of model errors through extensive model development. This
respondent explicitly regarded better models as improving science’s contribution to policy. He
regarded the science-policy interface as being robust to exposition of uncertainties in the science
base. Such respondents place more trust in the ability of the political and policy process, in its
interactions with scientific assessment, to deal intelligently with uncertainties, and accept the
necessary role of scientific judgement.
Further research would be required to understand fully the basis for these different responses
to our survey. However, the institutional affiliation of the respondent seems to us to matter.
Generally, where the respondent is part of a large climate modeling effort in a confident, well-
resourced, and respected organization, our enquiry was seen more positively or at least not as a
threat. Also dynamicist-oriented and purist modelers seemed to us to be more favorable to a
broader debate on flux adjustment for obvious reasons. One such modeler was, however, critical
of us and we suggest that this scientist—mistakenly—read into our survey a critique of GCMs,
and of the climate GCM community, which lent itself to the contrarian science cause. Finally, those
most critical of our study tended to be involved in formal scientific assessment, especially the
IPCC. It seemed like “second nature” for them to think about the political implications of our
enquiry. However, there were a few exceptions to this from advisory scientists who seemed to be
less concerned to control the flow of information between science and policy, though we are not in
a position to fully understand why there are such differences.
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5. CONCLUSIONS
One consequence of the highly politicised conflicts between contrarian scientists and the
mainstream as represented by the IPCC has been the relative neglect of controversies and
differences within the mainstream. Indeed, the presence of the contrarians, ready to make the most
of uncertainty and disagreement, may have inhibited the expression of such intra-peer community
differences. This has perhaps been exacerbated by the widespread belief among mainstream climate
scientists that many contrarians are motivated primarily by their political interests and beliefs rather
than by wishing to contribute to a peer community debate. We interpret the negative and defensive
responses we received to our enquiry from some respondents as reflecting (inter alia) distrust of
interest in model limitations from outside the peer community.
Our study indicates, however, that the debate over flux adjustment is more than a case of the
politically-motivated mis-representation of science. We have argued that there are different
“cultures” of GCM modeling with differences in opinion concerning flux adjustments. To identify
these cultures required detailed empirical exploration of GCM modeling Centers and interviews and
correspondence with researchers. We identified a “pragmatist” approach, in which GCMs were
being used for climate change simulations, usually for policy-oriented scientific assessments of the
anthropogenic greenhouse effect. Flux adjustments (and other short-cuts such as the spin-up of
ocean models with artificial boundary conditions) are part and parcel of this approach. By contrast,
“purists” regard the GCMs used by the pragmatists as inadequate, riddled with model errors,
requiring a substantive model development program. Those with the purist approach were
suspicious of flux adjustments as potentially covering-up model errors, influencing the model’s
variability, and leading to complacency in model improvements, and they entertained concerns
about the linearity assumption behind the use of flux adjustments (which indicates more
fundamental, if suspended, theoretical divergences).
These pragmatist and purist cultures emerge from the interplay of a heterogeneous range of
factors including: organizational mission, individual and collective research trajectories (including
past work experience and identification of future priorities and ambitions), funding patterns,
involvement in providing climate-impacts scientists with scenarios, the role of hierarchical
management and /or charisma of leaders of research groups, and different epistemic styles (those
who regard anthropogenic climate change as more of a thermodynamic problem than a dynamic
problem at the first approximation, and vice versa). The modelers’ judgement about using flux
adjustments, and how to represent its use to non-modelers, emerges in an institutional-political
context which stresses the importance of presenting a clear storyline about the likelihood and
broad-brush pattern of future climate change to the outside world.
While in some centers purist and pragmatist approaches were in conflict with one another
(e.g., Center 3) in others the purist and pragmatist identities seemed to co-exist quite happily and,
arguably, the organization as a whole benefitted from their co-habitation (e.g., Centers 1 and 2).
In these latter cases, the potential conflict between the two approaches was mediated and
minimised by one or more of the following:
• priority being given by an authoritative and charismatic individual leader, or by a
hierarchical decision-making structure, to what one scientist termed “predictive
understanding” (i.e., simulations which generated both policy-relevant predictions and
research-relevant insights);
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• the acceptance of a large influence from the research funder requesting that state-of-the-art
climate predictions be conducted; and,
• alternative networks of collaboration and research evaluation available for the purist
modelers in Centers 1 and 2, e.g., in model development work for numerical weather
prediction and, ultimately, for climate change predictions.
The purist-dynamicists’ arguments at Center 3 (reinforced by a collaborating academic
audience) may have dissuaded the pragmatist modelers from adopting the more overtly pragmatist
measures, such as flux adjustments. As one of the more pragmatically-oriented modelers at
Center 3 put it: “I guess we’ve been one of the conservative groups” [respondent E, interview 14
April 1994]. We should emphasise that identifying differences in scientific styles of this sort does
not imply that rational exchanges between the two styles cannot occur, since many common
commitments still exist which bridge these differences.
In the last section we also explored the reactions to our study from the scientists we contacted.
Unexpectedly, the responses we received revealed much of interest concerning how different
scientists interpreted our interest in flux adjustments. Some wished to draw a strong boundary
between science and policy, and to limit flux adjustment as an issue to science, best dealt with by
the peer community alone. Others appeared more willing to bend the boundary so that it included
commentators who could (probably) be trusted. Yet others operated with a fuzzier boundary
between science and policy, usually obtained from direct experience working in scientific
assessments. Some in this last group wanted scientists to keep tighter control on what information
and perspectives passed through that fuzzy zone, while others seemed more relaxed about
commentaries such as ours. A more definitive identification and characterisation of these forms of
“boundary-work”55 and an explanation of their differences, would require further research. We
note, however, that our findings correspond with other sociological studies of science. These
studies have shown the negotiated character of accepted boundaries between science and policy,
the ultimately contingent and contextual character of such settlements, and the necessity of
stabilising such boundaries and definitions in order for science to play its necessary role in public
policy (ibid.).
We have argued that debates over flux adjustment are a prism through which to explore the
social, policy and scientific assumptions and commitments of climate modelers. But what are the
possible uses of such insights? Charles Darwin once commented that: “How odd it is that anyone
should not see that all observation must be for or against some view if it is to be of any service.”56
In the spirit of that remark, we use our observations to advance a view of the role of science in
climate change policy which has been developed in the last decade or more, a view which contrasts
with the traditional idea of science as a pure realm which independently informs policy.
• We suggest that our analysis of the internal debate on flux adjustment helps climate
scientists, research funders and managers, climate model users (including policy makers)
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and journalists to better understand the social, policy and institutional dimensions to
controversies and differences of perspective within climate science. This may permit a more
constructive and discriminating dialogue to take place between different modeling
perspectives, as well as raising, and we hope clarifying, the role of policy considerations in
scientific decision-making.
• In more social science theoretical terms, we believe that our study provides further evidence
for a “mutual construction” of climate science and policy.57 That is, the modelers seem to
have an implicit view of the policy process which informs not only the way they present
their work, but what it is they actually do, their practices, and standards of evidence. Hence
the world outside of the direct peer community is incorporated into negotiations over what is
known, knowable, and worth doing within science. More speculatively, these scientific
practices, and the storylines they produce, may be incorporated into what is known,
knowable and considered worth doing within policy, such that the commitments at this
deeper, often tacit, level within science and policy come to reinforce one another, without
being deliberated on explicitly (as summarised in Figure 1).
• Though there is diversity in the modelers’ views of the needs of the policy process the
dominant strain is perhaps one which sees a need to carefully manage scientific uncertainty
lest policy development be hindered. This view of the vulnerabilities of the policy process to
scientific uncertainty is also shared by the climate change contrarians, who operate to
uncover and exploit uncertainties. Such a perspective certainly reflects a good dose of
realpolitik and experience of environmental policy making in industrialised countries. It is
especially pertinent in the USA, where research on risk assessment and regulation, and
decision-making on environmental controversies, reveals the strong pressures to reveal
uncertainty and use it to undermine a position against the interests of some policy actor. In
that sense, we might say that the advisory scientists who are wary of opening-up scientific
debate to a wider audience on an issue such as flux adjustment are being sensible politicians.
• Yet there is another way to view this approach to uncertainty, that it is an ultimately brittle
view of the science-policy process (at least in more fragmented and antagonistic political
cultures such as the USA) because it requires forms of policy and science that seldom
withstand strong critical scrutiny, especially as the political stakes rise.58 The robustness of
“science for policy” knowledge depends greatly on the kind of policy culture it may imply or
require, and on whether this kind is robust. An alternate view to that of realpolitik sees
politicization of climate science as more or less inevitable. Scientists may as well accept that
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as a given and find ways to cope constructively with such a political reality. Additionally,
climate change science is not like conventional basic research, where greater precision and
probabilistic assessments of uncertainty are (to some extent) feasible. The indeterminacy of
such “post-normal science”59 is more akin to the “regulatory science”60 which has striven to
provide assessments of the safety to humans of drugs, food additives, chemicals and the
like, with many problems emerging in the capacity of that science to identify and provide
probabilistic assessments of potential risks. All this suggests that climate change policy
makers cannot expect a quantified level of certainty, at least not with respect to all of the
issues which are likely to be critical for policy. Are advisory scientists who “manage” the
climate science-policy interface in danger of suggesting too much confidence in the ability of
science to produce certainty? Post-normal science also requires that we need to find ways to
communicate informed agreement and disagreement, and informed judgements concerning
levels of confidence in knowledge-claims,61 as well as divulging the processes by which
assumptions are formed and disagreements resolved. A wider appreciation of the
indeterminate character of climate change science among policy actors and the wider public
would possibly reduce some of the political effectiveness of the contrarians, because
uncertainty and limitations in climate knowledge would cease to be a prime cause for
disbelief or policy inaction.
• If openness, acknowledgments of compromise, and expression of uncertainty were the
initiative of mainstream scientists, rather than of hostile contrarians, then legitimate dissent
might have its place and the extra-scientific community would not have reasons to expect the
presence of “dirty secrets.” This might contribute to rebuilding relationships of trust (where
that is needed) between scientists, politicians, policy makers, and the public. In turn, this
might allow areas of consensus to emerge on beliefs about climate change, in contrast to the
present situation which has led to endless debate and paralysis
Finally, and more speculatively, we suggest that there are correspondences between the
scientific styles we have identified and scientists’ implicit ideas of policy. The purist tends to
suggest that policy can only be rational and legitimate if its founding knowledge is highly elaborate
and close to the best physical understanding. The pragmatist view on the other hand accepts that
adequate and defensible policy can be made on the basis of approximate knowledge embodying
epistemological norms. This latter view of policy could be seen as partly symbolic and implying
what sociologists have suggested, namely that “realist” languages serve the tacit roles of binding
together and supplying a discursive arena for an epistemic community which shares an interrelated
set of beliefs about nature and, to some extent, human responsibility and policy prescription.
It is not necessarily paradoxical that some purists maintain that public policy commitments can
be achieved even with knowledge which is explicitly provisional and uncertain and openly debated.
Rather this position may imply a belief in levels of public maturity in the face of uncertainty which
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the pragmatist frequently denies as possible or feasible. The pragmatist stance operates in scientific
assessments for policy by permitting openness, approximation and contingency within a
circumscribed community of scientists and policy makers. But at the same time it holds to a less
negotiable view of climate science as certain expert knowledge which is transferred in a linear
fashion to policy making. Purists seem less likely to adopt such a dualistic approach to the
evaluation of knowledge within and outside the extended peer community.
Thus the debate over flux adjustments involves different normative ideas: of the proper
boundary between science and policy; the proper background or foreground of scientific
assumptions and disagreements which cannot be resolved by straightforward appeals to nature
alone; and the proper distribution of responsibility for dealing with contingency between the
domain of science and the domain of public policy. It is perhaps in this area of where responsibility
should lie that our findings most impinge on debates about the role and definition of precaution in
the face of uncertainties about climate change.
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